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Condemned to Rootlessness: The Loyalist Origins of Canada's Identity Crisis
Introduction
In the view of the English-speaking Canadian media, Canada has an identity 
crisis, a situation attributable to divisions within the Canadian body politic that are 
regularly expressed in constitutional bickering between Quebec and the Rest of Canada 
and between the provinces and the federal government.1 Yet the identity crisis in the 
lifeworld of the average English-Canadian appears to possess a somewhat different 
quality. The following statement from Rod Lamirand, a resident of Surrey, B.C., 
expresses the subjectivity of this existential unease with remarkable accuracy: 
'We [our family] were isolated, self-sufficient, cut off from a close community 
and from our pasts...Our family was not drawn into a neighborhood of friends 
because of a shared difference from mainstream society. We didn't have a name 
for the cultural majority because for the most part they were us. We were part of 
the dominant cultural society and we had no real culture. The great wash of pale 
European blood that saturated this continent was uniform in color only. Much of 
what survived is a hodgepodge of eclectic, meaningless routines...We were the 
product of white bread and instant coffee, Hollywood and the CBC....'2 (emphasis 
added)
The connection between the Canadian identity crisis mentioned in the English-Canadian 
media and Lamirand's statement might appear distant. Surely, one might ask, the latter 
reflects a problem that should be labeled 'English-Canadian' rather than 'Canadian.' 
It is the position of this paper, however, that the discourses of English-Canadian 
and Canadian identity are inextricably bound. The connection lies with the fact that the 
English-Canadian ethnic core, which is of Loyalist origin, has spawned a nation, English 
Canada, which in turn has dominated a multi-national state, Canada. Hence English 
Canada' s salient identity is with the Canadian state, whose self-conception it also 
articulates. This means that fissures in the Loyalist ethnic core that gave rise to the 
nation will in turn be transmitted to the state level. Bearing this in mind we may better 
understand Seymour Martin Lipset's classic observation: 
'National identity is the quintessential Canadian issue. Almost alone among 
modern developed countries, Canada has continued to debate its self-conception 
to the present day. One of its leading historians notes that it 'has suffered for more 
than a century from a somewhat more orthodox and less titillating version of 
Portnoy's complaint: the inability to develop a secure and unique identity. And 
so...intellectuals and politicians have attempted to play psychiatrist to the 
Canadian Portnoy, hoping to discover a national identity....The reasons for this 
uncertainty are clear. Canada is a residual country. Before 1776, Anglophone 
Canadians possessed the same traits that distinguished other American colonists 
from the British. Then...the new nation to the south developed a political identity 
formulated around the values set out in the Declaration of Independence....There 
is no ideology of Canadianism, although Canada has a Tory tradition derived 
from Britain and is, like the United States, descended from a North American 
settler and frontier society.'3 
Following Lipset, it is argued here that the existential problem of the English-speaking 
Canadian conscience collective stems not from the linguistic divisions between English 
and French Canada but rather from the divisions within English Canada. This represents a 
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view very different from that which may be found in most analyses of Canadian identity, 
whether by journalists or academics.4 
The nature of the internal cleavage within English Canada consists, as Lipset 
noted, of a tension between American and British inheritances. Each inheritance in turn 
consists of two parts. The first involves a dual political culture of, on the one hand, 
American 'Whig' liberalism and, on the other, British 'Tory' conservatism. This 
ideological divide has been fairly well-documented in the literature.5 The second part 
consists of a dual ethno-symbolic inheritance: an American folk culture revolving around 
a pioneering New World lifestyle and a British set of myths, symbols and collective  
representations. This latter, more particularistic phenomenon has been only superficially 
addressed in the literature and never from the standpoint of theories of ethnicity.
This paper asserts that Lipset's Hartzian focus on the divergent political cultures 
bequeathed by British and American sources provides an insufficient explanation of 
English-Canadian existential anxiety. In failing to address the ethno-national 
consciousness of English-Canadians, Lipset's assertion about the fragility of Canadian 
identity, while true, remains incomplete. Lipset's position must therefore be 
complemented by an investigation into the role played by the ethno-symbolic traditions 
which accompanied the British and American political cultures. The aim of this essay is 
to explore this omission: to incorporate some of the insights recently developed by 
theorists of ethnicity and nationalism into the analysis of Canadian identity. 
Any effort of this type must first consider the connection between nations, which 
are products of modernity, and their pre-modern ethnic antecedents. According to A.D. 
Smith, ethnic groups, or ethnies, loosely defined, are communities of descent 
symbolically attached to a particular 'homeland.' Nations, on the other hand, are 
communities of territory and mass culture, whose members are linked economically, 
politically and socially.6 States, in turn, are political units which may encompass several 
nations, as in the case of Canada. 
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Based on these definitions, the Canadian state consists of at least two major 
nations: English Canada and Quebec. In turn, each has its roots in an ethnic core: in the 
case of Quebec, this core is Canadien, and in the case of English Canada, it is Loyalist-
Britannic.7 As Smith notes, most nations emerge when pre-modern ethnic polities 
undergo a 'triple revolution' of modernization: economic, military-administrative and 
cultural-educational.8  In the process, the ethnic core attempts to assimilate ethnic 
minorities into itself in a project of nation-building. Of course, this attempt to remake the 
citizenry along the lines of the dominant ethnie is seldom completely successful, with 
minorities often rejecting the 'high culture' of the new nation-state.9  Notwithstanding this 
minority resistance, what is important is the manner in which the new nation's symbols 
display continuity with that of the founding ethnic group. Smith explains why this is the 
case: 
'Since ethnies are by definition associated with a given territory, not infrequently 
a chosen people with a particular sacred land, the presumed boundaries of the 
nation are largely determined by the myths and memories of the dominant ethnie, 
which include the foundation charter, the myth of the golden age and the 
associated territorial claims, or ethnic title-deeds.' 10 
Moreover, national cultures are intimately linked with their ethnic pasts because the quest 
for national solidarity and legitimacy causes the state to seek recourse to unifying myths 
of common historical origins and genealogical descent.11
English-Canadians in the North American context
A brief look at some of the ethnies that shared the North American continent with 
the English-Canadians in the nineteenth century will serve to illustrate Smith's point. In 
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present-day Quebec, centred on the St. Lawrence, was a population of French-speaking 
Canadiens who traced their origins back to the permanent settlement of Quebec City by 
Samuel de Champlain in 1608. Moreover, this population could trace its ancestry to a 
mere few thousand French settlers, most of whom had arrived in the seventeenth century 
under the colonization scheme of Jean-Baptiste Colbert. In New France, as in New Spain, 
criollo ethnic consciousness began to develop vis à vis the metropole, accentuated by the 
fall of New France in 1763. By the 1820s, a new middle class, sprung from the upper 
levels of St. Lawrence habitant society, fomented the first French-Canadian 
nationalism.12  
This nationalism, which took on both conservative and liberal forms, later came to 
fixate on the territory of Quebec, a nation whose culture was to flow firmly from the 
Canadien ethnic core. We can see this ethnie-nation link in the writings of prominent 
Quebec nationalists. For instance, Abbé Lionel Groulx' statement, in 1922, that 
Quebecers are bound organically to 'la patrie naturelle' meshed well with Maurice 
Duplessis' description of Quebecers' cultural markers as 'la foi, la langue, [et] la race'. 
The ethnie-nation logic was also confirmed by Réné Levesque, who pronounced in 1968 
that 'we are children of that society, in which the habitant, our father or grandfather, was 
still the key citizen...we are, even more intimately, heirs to the group obstinacy which has 
kept alive that portion of French America we call Quebec.'13  Even if we fix the settlement 
date of New France at 1600, which is considerably earlier than effective settlement took 
place, the genesis of French-Canadian ethnicity occurred in under two hundred years. 
This achievement was not as unusual as it might seem, for, to the south of the 
French lay the 'Americans', an Anglophone people who had developed a sense of ethnic 
consciousness by 1820. Many might question the assertion that American ethnicity ever 
existed. In fact most observers prefer to see the United States as an 'exceptional' nation, a 
political union of disparate states founded on civic principles of universal liberty that was 
unlike any previous creation.14  However, a close examination of American history 
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reveals that this was not so. From the beginning, the homogeneity of the colonial 
population ensured that an ethnic consciousness grew up alongside the civic state. This 
homogeneity is evident in the origin of the free population of the United States at the time 
of the American Revolution: it was over 60 per cent English, nearly 80 per cent British 
and 98 per cent Protestant.15   
Each major region of the United States had its core ethno-religious group, all of 
which were British Protestant. New England was dominated by East English 
Congregationalists, the Coastal South by South English Cavaliers, the Middle Atlantic by 
the Quakers and the great swath of Appalachian backcountry from Pennsylvania  to 
Georgia by 'Scotch-Irish' Presbyterians.16 These groups were drawn together by a shared 
belief in individual liberty and by the generally non-conformist nature of American 
Protestantism, a feature which even permeated the supposedly established Episcopal and 
Presbyterian churches. Further unity was provided by New England's idealism, which 
gave to the United States a providential role in bringing about the millenium on earth. 
The nation-wide religious revival known as the Great Awakening (1725-50) helped 
disseminate such ideas, which were furthered by the American Revolution (1776-83) and 
by a second Great Awakening during 1780-1830.17 
The Revolution, meanwhile, took on religious significance and was interpreted 
ethnically by the Founding Fathers as the final realization of the primitive Anglo-Saxon 
liberal impulse, which, freed from its Norman (i.e. British) oppressor, was chosen to do 
its work in the New World. In other words, Americans were descended from oppressed 
Anglo-Saxons who had self-selected themselves from Britain as immigrants to America.18 
As Thomas Jefferson noted to John Adams in 1776, the Americans were: 
'The children of Israel in the wilderness, led by a cloud by day and a pillar of fire 
by night; and on the other side, Hengist and Horsa, the Saxon chiefs from whom 
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we claim the honour of being descended, and whose political principles and form 
of government we have assumed.'19 (emphasis added) 
Several cultural markers framed this new myth of descent, namely the English language, 
the Protestant faith, Liberal individualism and a northern European phenotype. 
Linguistically and religiously distinct from the French to the north and west and the 
Spanish to the south, the Americans also asserted their ideological distinctiveness from 
the British across the Atlantic and their racial particularity vis à vis the blacks and natives 
within. 
Anglo-conformity, meanwhile, had colonial origins and spurred the expansion of 
the American ethnic core, absorbing non-English groups like the Huguenots, Welsh and a 
considerable number of Dutch and Germans.20  As Richard Burkey put it, 'although 
pockets of European ethnicity still remained, by 1820 the great majority of the citizens of 
the new country were subscribing to a new ethnicity - American; only the racial groups 
were excluded from membership.'21
Considering that the Puritans had arrived in Massachusetts in the 1620s, the 
gestation period for the American ethnie was roughly two hundred years, similar to our 
conservative estimate of Canadien ethnogenesis. Some might argue that these new 
formations on the North American ethnographic landscape can be attributed to their 
seventeenth century antiquity. This thesis can be refuted, though, if we examine the 
origin of an ethnic group whose roots begin in the mid to late eighteenth century. 
At this time, a mixed-race population descended from French fur traders and Cree 
Natives began to congregate at Red River, in latter-day Manitoba.22 Less than a century 
later, between 1815 and 1850, a sense of Métis ethnic consciousness had crystallized. As 
Jacqueline Peterson writes, this new Métis 'nation' possessed numerous cultural markers, 
notably a distinct language, syncretic cosmology and religious repertoire, as well as 
unique modes of dress, cuisine, architecture, dance and music. To this was added, after 
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1815, a quasi-military political organization, a flag, a bardic tradition, a rich folklore and 
a national history.23
All of which begs the question of Anglo-Canadian ethnogenesis. If other 
populations managed to develop distinct descent communities with unique cultural 
attributes and a sense of indigenous territoriality, what happened to the group of Tory 
refugees from Revolutionary America and their later accretions? As we shall see, the new 
English-Canadian society failed to develop a sense of indigenous ethnic consciousness 
due to a peculiar contradiction within its founding myth.
The Coming of the United Empire Loyalists
As noted, the British Protestant population of the colonial United States shared 
many similar cultural orientations, most notably an individualistic, democratic 
temperament, which suffused both their secular lives and their brand of Protestantism. 
Nevertheless, within this population there existed a number of fault lines, the most 
important of which was loyalty to the Crown. In New England and Virginia, both 
populous areas, support for the Crown was weak and civilian protest against the colonial 
administration common. Boston, home of New England providentialism, was a particular 
hotbed of agitation, and considered any legislation that blocked its commercial and 
religious destiny as cause for revolt. For instance, in 1765, a mob, angry at the imposition 
of the Stamp Act, destroyed the houses of Governor Thomas Hutchinson and that of 
Andrew Oliver, a prominent colonial official. A few years later, similar violence 
prompted the police to strike back, in a famous incident known as the 'Boston Massacre.' 
Civil disobedience such as this did not lead to a widespread feeling for 
independence, however, something which Jefferson, Washington and other American 
Whigs didn't even consider until 1774-5.24  Even less well-known is that many Americans 
opposed independence after it was declared. Some estimate that as much as one-third of 
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the American population was loyal to the Crown at this time.25  During and after the 
Revolution, social pressure on Tory supporters was immense. After the Declaration of 
Independence, Tories came under increasing persecution from angry mobs. Tarring and 
feathering, 'riding the rail' and the destruction of property were the favoured means of 
intimidation by 1776. The mob, which was organized around citizens' bodies like the 
Sons of Liberty, had its activities backed by Test Law legislation from the Continental 
Congress, which required that all citizens swear allegiance to their state and abjure 
allegiance to the Crown. Furthermore, in 1777, with the Congress low on funds, it was 
agreed that Loyalist property would be seized and sold to replenish government coffers. 
In New York alone, over £3,600,000 worth of Loyalist property was confiscated.26  
Given this state of anarchy, it is unsurprising that the majority of Tory supporters 
either renounced their old loyalties or went underground. Yet a hard core of Tories 
remained loyal to the Crown and these 19,000 Loyalist troops proved themselves among 
the most effective British fighting forces. Retreating to the Quebec border, they mounted 
a series of raids in upstate New York and Pennsylvania before ceasing their activities in 
response to the peace at Versailles in 1783. 
A year later, these soldiers and their families left for the colonies of Quebec and 
Nova Scotia. There they joined 200,000 French Canadians and a small enclave of roughly 
14,000 English-speaking settlers, effectively creating the basis for a new society. Prior to 
the arrival of the Loyalists, Governor Carleton of Quebec had assumed that the [British 
North American] colonies 'must, to the end of time, be peopled by the [French] Canadian 
race, who have already taken such firm root, and got to so great a height, that any new 
[British] stock transplanted will be totally hid....'27 By 1800, the situation had changed: the 
colonial population of some 300,000 was 30 per cent English-speaking. 
The Social Bases of Loyalism
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The reasons for Loyalism were as varied as the Loyalists' social backgrounds. 
Categories of people most likely to become Loyalists included the British-born, 
Anglicans and the Colonial Elites (political and religious). Least likely to be Loyalists 
were Presbyterians, New Englanders, the yeoman middle class and Scotch-Irish 
Backcountry settlers.28 Notwithstanding these generalizations, the Loyalist-Patriot divide 
also owed much to timing and local circumstance. Thus in the North Carolina 
Backcountry, many Scottish Highlanders became Tories because their hated Scotch-Irish 
neighbours were pro-Independence Whigs.29 
Loyalism could also be a result of personal differences of belief system. The 
example of the American political elite is illustrative in this regard.  For example, 
Benjamin Franklin's son William was a Tory and Colonel John Butler of the Tory 
Butler's Rangers, 'found himself confronted by his Whig cousins, Colonel William Butler 
and Colonel Zeb Butler.'30  The idiosyncratic nature of the Loyalist-Patriot split meant 
that many people literally found themselves 'caught' on the wrong side after the war. As 
Dennis Duffy notes, 'no array of facts has yet supported a profile of the American Tory 
that limits him to a particular social class or group.'31  If any one factor could be found to 
account for Loyalism it would be that Loyalists tended to be marginal types: un-
assimilated Dutch and Germans, Anglicans in Congregationalist New England, 
Presbyterians in the Episcopalian South and Pacifists like the Quakers. As W. H. Nelson 
notes: 'almost all the Loyalists were, in one way or another, more afraid of America than 
they were of Britain.'32 
The Tory Culture of the Loyalist Elite
The Loyalists were Americans, but were led by a Tory elite that differed in 
several ways from the Whig elite to the south. For one thing, many of the Loyalist elite 
were Anglican and supported the idea of a national English church, a concept frowned 
10
upon by sectarian U.S. Protestants.33 In addition, the Loyalist elite believed in the 
importance of order and sought to achieve change within the British system rather than 
through rebellion.34  In the years following their migration to Canada, they evolved an 
ideology of anti-Americanism whose rhetoric the Loyalists hoped would be matched by 
American failure. The cautiousness of Loyalism with regard to change was matched by 
their sense of marginality and defeat, linked to both their expulsion and the outsider 
status of the groups from which many Loyalists derived. 
The American Culture of the Loyalists
The Loyalists' Tory elite was not wholly representative of the majority of Loyalist 
refugees, who were basically Anglo-Americans inclined, for either economic or symbolic 
reasons, toward allegiance to the Crown. What implications did this have for the ethnic 
identity of the Loyalists? To answer this question we must identify the link between 
culture and ethnicity. 
John Armstrong's analysis is useful in this regard. He has noted that linguistic 
boundary divisions between Slavic, Germanic and Latin language families often gave rise 
to ethnic boundaries.35 He makes a similar point with respect to religious difference, 
illustrating how the medieval Islam-Christendom frontier produced many an ethnic 
group.36  Benjamin Akzin's notion that ethnic groups are strengthened by cultural 
'similarity-dissimilarity' patterns supports Armstrong's thesis.37 When seeking to 
differentiate the Americans from the English, for instance, we have noted how the 
differing ideology, theology, dialect, lifestyle and landscape of the Americans served as 
crucial markers which American intellectuals could use to develop a separate sense of 
American ethnicity vis á vis Britain. 
In the (Anglo) Canadian case, however, no such cultural differentiae presented 
themselves vis á vis the United States. Most Loyalists spoke with an American accent, 
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believed in liberal democracy and individualism, shared an 'American' landscape and 
pursued a pioneering North American lifestyle.38 Hence they were culturally 
indistinguishable from the Americans, a pattern which offered little grist for the 
nationalist mill of later generations of English-Canadian intellectuals, confounding 
Anglo-Canadian ethnogenesis.  
The War of 1812
1807 had marked the start of American Whig fervour in the United States in 
support of the French cause. By 1812, the United States had joined the French in 
declaring war on Britain. Federalist opposition was suppressed and republican mobs, a 
throwback to the anti-Tory mobs of the Revolution, roamed cities like Baltimore, where 
they destroyed a Federalist newspaper.39 British regulars began engaging American forces 
at Detroit, Niagara and Michilmackinac, where a combination of British and Loyalist 
troops successfully repulsed a more numerous American invading force. General Isaac 
Brock, a Loyalist leader and prominent Upper Canadian, was dubbed 'Father of his 
People' for his victories at Michilmackinac, Detroit and Queenston Heights, where he 
died heroically.40 
At the same time, the British Navy blockaded the coast and sent reinforcements to 
Halifax while Upper Canadians and British militias fought inland. Although York, the 
capital of Upper Canada, was burned, the British side successfully invaded Virginia and 
razed Washington, the new capital of the Republic. Having occupied Washington and 
tightened its blockade, the British began to talk peace with the Americans, something 
which was achieved by 1815. 
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Already, the War was being turned to mythical ends in Upper Canada: Britain had 
defended her colonies and Providence had ensured the 
'Triumph of virtue over vice, of a good cause over a bad one...Together, Upper 
Canadians came to believe, they had vanquished the forces of tyranny and 
oppression. Out of the war there arose a sense of community, an awareness of 
being Upper Canadian, which encompassed all settlers. The War of 1812 came to 
be considered by many as the colony's rite of passage into young adulthood.'41 
The Genesis of Loyalist Consciousness
Maintaining British form while acting out liberal, American substance is the best 
way of describing the Loyalist psyche, and it was this psyche which remains integral to 
understanding the English-Canadian mind today. Anthropological approaches to ethnicity 
describe the substance/form distinction in terms of the etic/emic dichotomy. The term etic 
refers to the 'analyst's concepts, descriptions and analyses.'42 Etic forms of identity rely 
upon objectively verifiable cultural differentiae. Hence we may regard the Loyalists to be 
etically American by virtue of their folk culture and lifestyle.
Emic forms of identity rely instead on the categories used by the natives to 
identify themselves. Emic forms of identity thereby depend on self-perception and need 
not be based upon any concrete cultural markers. The classic example of an etic non-
group with an emic identity concerns the Lue in Thailand who, though they 'lived in close 
interaction with other groups in the area...had no exclusive livelihood, no exclusive 
language, no exclusive customs, no exclusive religion.'43 Thus the Loyalists may be 
viewed as emically Britannic, a consequence of the British nature of their communal 
narrative and symbolic attachments. 
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This mindset developed from the peculiar circumstances that the Loyalists endured. 
'[They] resembled closely the persecutors from whom they fled. This fact 
deprived them of the luxury of unambiguous hatred of their own former 
adversaries. Rather, their attitude was one of ambivalence: the Loyalists found 
themselves hating America, but loving and envying it as well. As a result, the 
Loyalists were deprived of the opportunity of erecting their values - which were 
virtually identical to those of the Americans - into a national identity.'44  
One consequence of an etically groundless emic identity is a liminal, unstable sense of 
self which goes unrecognized by a generalized Other and is constantly in danger of being 
challenged.45 In Canada, the Loyalists were challenged, but only in England were they 
exposed. There, the returning Loyalist '[saw] himself as he really is - a confirmed 
American...The Loyalist in England suffers excruciating torture. He pines his life away 
wishing for his homeland. He packs his bag, in anticipation of the trip he will never 
make.'46 The Loyalists who returned to England were not only exposed to others, but to 
themselves as well. This is confirmed by Kenneth McRae, who wrote that the several 
thousand American Tories who returned to Britain were scathing in their indictment of 
the hierarchical, 'confining' society they found there.47   In contrast to the realistic, 
dispirited pathos of these returning English Loyalists, the Canadian Loyalists had the 
luxury of reacting to their situation inauthentically by creating a new, ultra-British 
identity for themselves. As David Bell notes, 
'Robbed of his [American] identity, the Canadian Loyalist invented a new one. It 
is never a totally adequate substitute, of course. How can it be, when he must 
continuously deny its very essence, liberalism? "The typical Canadian," an 
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Englishman observed a hundred years ago, "tells you that he is not, but he is a 
Yankee-a Yankee in the sense in which we use the term at home, as synonymous 
with everything that smacks of democracy...." The Loyalist in Canada will always 
be faced with the paradox of being an "anti-American Yankee." But he has a way 
out of his dilemma: he creates a myth that helps him survive-he insists that he is 
British.'48 
The British attachments of the Loyalists were soon expressed in the covenantal manner of 
the Old Testament.49  Thus after the defeat of Napoleon, we hear Bishop Jacob Mountain 
of Quebec exclaim: '[We British], happily for ourselves, and for the world, [were] made 
the instruments of chastising the arrogance and humbling the power of France...[Great 
Britain was] the delegated instrument of Providence to arrest the progress of anarchy and 
impiety, and to vindicate the cause of Religion, social order, and regulated Government 
throughout this habitable earth.'50  Even more stridently nationalist was Anglican 
clergyman John Strachan, rector of York, who claimed that 'what the Israelites of old 
were to the surrounding nations, so the British appear to be to the present inhabitants of 
the world.'51 
These exhortations indicate that Anglo-Canadians were being given a purely 
British view of themselves and their mission. However, within the English-Canadian 
story was reserved a special series of episodes for Britain's chosen American servants: the 
Loyalists. For example, Bishop Mountain, while asserting the idea that the British were 
the elect, claimed that Canadians were Britain's 'highly favoured children.'52 John 
Strachan was just as explicit when he said in 1814 that Upper Canadians fighting in the 
War of 1812 'have gained a name among our fellow-subjects which will be forever 
precious.'53 
The message coming from these Canadian Anglicans is that although the British 
were God's chosen people, the Canadians were the elect of the elect. Notice what these 
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clergymen did not say. They refrained from asserting that Canadians were a separate race 
from the British with a separate destiny. Added, therefore, to the lack of unique English-
Canadian cultural markers was a British ethnic loyalty that shrunk from expressions of 
indigenous Canadian-ness. In combination, these factors blocked the process of ethnic 
fission which had led to ethnogenesis in the American and Canadien cases.
Challenge of Reform
American substance and British form formed the contradiction that was the 
Loyalist. This contradiction quickly became institutionalized as a class divide, especially 
in Upper Canada. On one side of the divide lay the Anglo-Canadian rural masses, often 
Methodist in religion, democratic in culture and Reformist by temperament, while on the 
other resided the Tory elite: Anglican, aristocratic and conservative. This generated a 
conflict between Reform and Tory elements which had its roots in the post-Revolutionary 
era. 
At that time, the presence of settlers with a democratic outlook had forced the 
creation of Upper Canada (in 1791), while attempts by the Anglican elite to secure 
privileges for themselves and their church were met with equal indignation.54  The 
strength of the democratic element can be gauged in Upper Canada by the fact that 60 per 
cent of the population was Methodist in 1812. Their nature was attested to by John 
Howison, who spent two and a half years in Upper Canada between 1818 and 1820. 
Howison described English-Canadian society in the same terms in which Tocqueville 
later described American society, writing that the inhabitants of the Talbot settlement on 
Lake Erie (near London) formed 'a democracy, such as, I believe, is hardly to be met with 
in any other part of the world...any poor starving peasant, who comes into the settlement, 
will meet with nearly the same respect as the wealthiest person....'55  
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Religious matters emerged as an early irritant, as the Anglicans tried to claim 
established church status, with attendant land reserves and restrictions on the 
solemnization of Methodist marriages.56 Later, pressure for greater political representation 
developed and by 1834, William Lyon Mackenzie, a Scottish immigrant, was building a 
radical movement in Upper Canada. His demands included responsible government, the 
separation of church and state and other republican proposals.57 
The difference between Mackenzie's rebellion in Upper Canada and that of Louis-
Joseph Papineau in Lower Canada, both in 1837, illustrates how the English-Canadian 
bipolar (British-American) identity differed from that of the French. Whereas Papineau 
could frame his struggle as a French nationalist struggle against the Tory English, 
Mackenzie found himself in opposition to his own English-Canadian-ness. He was 
thereby forced to defend a position of anti-Tory disloyalty because for the English-
Canadian elite, Toryness was equivalent to English-Canadian-ness. Thus his attempt to 
elucidate an Upper Canadian particularism quickly flowed into Americanism. 
For instance, he asked that supporters be 'more Canadian' in their 'habits and 
feelings' and  to throw away their 'lip-loyal feelings and sayings of other countries,' while 
substituting 'the word patriotic for the word loyalty.' Yet as part of this programme, the 
advantages of joining the United States were attractively put forth.58  It seems that 
Canadian political liberalism had only one symbolic resource: Americanism. Thus while 
movements toward liberal-democratic reform (including rebellion) in the United States 
and French Canada contributed toward ethnic self-definition, similar movements in 
English Canada led toward ethnic dissolution because Toryism was at the heart of 
English Canada's Loyalist founding myth.59 
In addition, Mackenzie's use of the term 'Canadian' seemed to indicate that the 
American cultural markers of most Upper Canadians: speech, lifestyle and liberal 
philosophy, were expressive of Canadianism, as opposed to the aristocratic, imperial, 
mercantile elitism of Tory Loyalism. The extent to which his sentiments (though not his 
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actions) were shared by the mass of the population is unknown, but S.D. Clark claims 
that most Canadians were in fact anti-Tory in ideology, wishing only to be North 
American.60 Though exaggerating somewhat, Clark draws our attention to the polarity 
between the American-Methodist-Reform and British-Anglican-Tory components of 
Anglo-Canadian identity. 
This crack in the English-Canadian body social was only sealed following the 
growth of British reform movements, which helped legitimate those in Canada. These 
tended to argue that Britain was the source of true liberty as opposed to the lawless slave 
republic to the south. For example, Joseph Howe, a Nova Scotia reformer, countered his 
monarchist critics, asking where, 'excepting the British Isles...upon the wide surface of 
the globe...[is] an equal amount of freedom, prosperity and happiness...enjoyed?'61 
Meanwhile, the large number of Irish Protestants streaming into the country 
combined strong British loyalty with democratic radicalism, undercutting the Tory-
Loyalty tie.62  By the 1850s, Lord Durham had delivered his infamous report, responsible 
government had been achieved in Canada and a new reciprocity treaty had been signed 
with the United States. This was an age of liberalism, and a new synthesis of British 
loyalty and democratic liberalism emerged under George Brown's Clear Grits. 
Commenting on the pivotal 1859 Reform Convention, Brown wrote, 'Perhaps the most 
distinctively Canadian characteristic of the debate was the play and counter-play of 
British and American influences. Expressions of loyalty [to the Queen], thrown about 
with the greatest zeal, were invariably cheered to the echo_Annexation was condemned 
on all sides, and solemn warnings were given of the possible dire results of encouraging 
dangerous associations with the republican relative.'63 The new liberal-Loyalist synthesis 
that Brown consummated helped sever the connection between class, ideology and 
loyalty by the time of Canadian Confederation in 1867. This helped redefine the English-
Canadian national conundrum as a purely formal contest between British symbolism and 
American lifestyle imagery. 
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The British Ascendancy
The new synthesis between loyalty and liberty that had been secured in English 
Canada set the stage for the creation of a unified Britannic consciousness that cut across 
the fault line of ideology. Thus between Confederation and the end of World War I, the 
British pole of Anglo-Canadian identity dominated. This new ethnic consciousness 
named the Loyalists as a chosen founding people, but framed this sense of chosenness 
very much within the fold of the British Empire. In other words, while the Loyalists were 
chosen, they were merely part of a broader Elect, and their deeds existed to serve the 
Empire. There issued therefore, a parallel development of Loyalist mythology and 
Britannic sentiment.
Loyalist Revival in the post-Confederation period
Several events served to generate a sense of ethnic nationalism among English-
Canadian intellectuals in the latter half of the nineteenth century. The first was the Fenian 
threat of 1866 and the general suspicion of the United States aroused by the slogan of 
Manifest Destiny. With boundaries in dispute and friction along the border, the local 
environment was ripe for expressions of Canadian particularism. The second factor had 
less to do with local events than with international currents of romanticism borne ashore 
from Europe. In particular, the works of Sir Walter Scott, which also inspired the 
Confederate rebels in the United States, were of great influence. 
Scott's work was particularly well-suited to the Loyalists because of their defeated 
position - a wound that needed treatment with the medicine of romanticism. This 
romanticism, 'chiefly the historical romances of Sir Walter Scott, would soon make 
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poetic the plight of the loser, the colourful refugee torn from his former existence and 
plunged into a harsher one...'64  Meanwhile, victory in the war of 1812 was viewed as an 
act of redemption, as Scott's romanticism was seamlessly interwoven with Protestant 
covenantalism: 
'Sir Walter Scott's evocations of a vanished feudal Scotland had decked out 
defeated minorities in gorgeous robes. Now theories of popular and mass 
sovereignty, however alien and remote, gave to 1812 the aura of a people's 
war...the despised minority became a saving remnant, and the stout-hearted 
pilgrim-refugees an exemplar of the collective heroism and strength to be found in 
the common people.'65 
Victory in the War of 1812 was not only a vindication of the suffering of the Loyalist 
exiles, but provided proof that God was rewarding the Loyalists for honouring their 
covenant with Great Britain. Some of the more important English-Canadian works 
inspired by Scott during this period included Charles Mair's Tecumseh (1886), Sarah 
Anne Curzon's Laura Secord (1887), William Kirby's Canadian Idylls (1888) and Agnes 
Maule Machar's For King and Country (1874).66 These tomes generally reinforced the 
lineaments of the Loyalist myth: the exile from Egypt (America), the redemption (the gift 
of Canada), the construction of a garden of Eden out of the wilderness (a civilized, 
orderly, un-American Canada), and the vindication (victory in 1812) achieved through 
fealty to the covenant (loyalty to the Crown).67
In tandem with developments in the literary sphere went those in the realm of 
history. In New England, American historians were openly nostalgic, celebrating the 
virtues of Jeffersonian Yeoman Republicanism and comparing ancient Anglo-Saxon 
society with that of rural New England.68  In the same manner, English-Canadian 
historians in the 1880s, many of Loyalist descent, coupled the nation's development 
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firmly to its Loyalist past. They described the Loyalists as the cream of colonial America 
and actively tried to weave images of old English aristocracy into their own nostalgic 
personal narratives.69 
This historiography worked its way into popular consciousness through literature, 
civic celebrations like the Loyalist centennial of 1884, and via the school system. This 
was especially evident in Ontario where Sir George Ross, the minister of education, had 
close ties to Sir George Taylor Denison, an influential Loyalist intellectual.70 The result 
was that the Loyalist revival generated a sense of identification with the United Empire 
Loyalists that transcended the ranks of actual Loyalist descendants. This attitude is 
exemplified by writer Charles Mair, who told George T. Denison that he felt 'as much a 
U.E. Loyalist as you or anybody.'71  
The Development of Britannic ethnic nationalism
Charles Mair exemplified the connection between Loyalist origins and a new 
sense of pan-British ethnic identity that united all the British peoples of the Empire.  The 
Empire had figured prominently in the Loyalist covenant and the Loyalists always acted 
with subservience to the idea of British unity. Mair, for example, wrote heroic Loyalist 
literature, yet framed this within a grander British narrative in his drama Tecumseh 
(1886):
'For I believe, in Britain's Empire, and
In Canada, its true and loyal son,
Who yet shall rise to greatness, and shall stand
At England's shoulder helping her to guard
True liberty throughout a faithless world.'72
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This imperial consciousness has been ably described as 'Britannic' by Douglas Cole. As 
he puts it, 
'Imperialists were imperialists in large measure because they were acutely 
conscious of ethnic ties and ethnic differentiation. Their own ethnic consciousness 
was deeply British ("Britannic" is a less confusing word) and Anglo-Saxon. Their 
ethnic identification, bolstered by commonality of culture (e.g. language and 
institutions), by common ethnic origin (e.g. "race" and ancestry), by the feeling of 
a common history, and by the belief in a common destiny, has all the 
characteristics of nationalism.'73 
The nature of Canadian pan-Britishness, or Britannicism, was enriched by its United 
Empire Loyalist mythology and the two were often bound together. For instance, many of 
those in Canada who supported the idea of imperial federation also drew on Loyalist 
mythology for inspiration. In fact, George T. Denison and George R. Parkin, two of the 
chief spokesmen of imperial federation, were keenly interested in the mythology of their 
Loyalist roots. As Carl Berger notes, 'the loyalist tradition was to provide one of the most 
potent elixirs to Canadian imperial sentiment and the descendants of the loyalists were to 
constitute the major source of the [Imperial Federation] League's support.'74 
The Imperial Federation League, with its support for closer ties to Britain and its 
scorn for Reciprocity, claimed a quarter of Canadian parliamentarians in 1890 and it was 
in this period that it was led by the illustrious D'Alton McCarthy. McCarthy's Celtic 
Protestant background is significant in that it illustrates the power of Loyalism among the 
English-Canadian majority in 1871, over half of whom were Scottish or Irish 
Protestants.75 Most of these were British immigrants of the 1815-65 period who flocked to 
Upper Canada, where they reinforced rather than retarded the Loyalist-Imperial 
connection. 
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The case of the Ulster Protestants is particularly germane here. Nearly equal in 
numbers to the Scots, the largest immigrant group, the Ulstermen's traditional loyalism, 
expressed through the Orange Order, took easy root in English Canada. The Orange 
Order had been founded in Brockville, Upper Canada in 1830 and by 1860 had grown to 
include, by some estimates, a membership of 100,000. More a social institution than 
anything else, the Orange Lodge was not exclusively Ulster-Scot in membership, but 
welcomed many of Loyalist descent within its ranks.76 Meanwhile, since one in four 
English-Canadians was Irish Protestant, the Order was to take on great significance as a 
bastion of Loyalism: 'By providing, as it often did, the shock troops of Canadian toryism, 
it [the Order] proved to be one of the most important consequences of the recent British 
immigration. An element had been introduced into Canadian life that was to have 
remarkable durability over the next century and more.'77 
This congruence of loyalisms allowed the Orangeman to submerge his Protestant 
loyalty within Canada's United Empire Loyalist mythology. The new synthesis is best 
expressed by Clarke Wallace, grand master of the Orange Association of British North 
America, who proclaimed that: 'it is not religion which is at the bottom of the matter 
but...race feeling.'78  This kind of sentiment was in turn reciprocated by George Sterling 
Ryerson, president of the United Empire Loyalist Association, who gave his assent to the 
Orange-influenced Protestant Protective Association during the Manitoba Schools 
question. 
As for the Scots, who were equal in size to the Protestant Irish by 1871, they 
could identify with Loyalism not only through their British immigrant origins, but 
through their political prominence in Canada, exemplified by figures like Prime Minister 
John A. Macdonald and Fathers of Confederation like George Brown, Alexander Tilloch 
Galt and Oliver Mowat.79
      A series of conflicts helped reinforce the new English-Canadian identity and 
develop it into a nationalist movement that integrated imperial and local events. These 
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conflicts included the Crimean War (1854-6), the Riel Rebellions (1869-70, 1885), the 
Manitoba Schools Question (1890), the Boer War (1899-1902) and the First World War 
(1914-18). In many nationalist addresses, rhetoric about the glory of Empire was linked 
with the idea of the Britannic blood tie and the special position of English Canada. 
This appears relatively consistent throughout the period. Thus petitioners for 
donations to the Crimean campaign in 1850's St. Catharines could speak as 'members of 
the same body [as England], in whose veins the same blood circulates.'80  This was 
clarified by George T. Denison, who prophesied that the British race would grow soft 
'unless the new blood in the Colonies will leaven the mass.'81 Some sixty years after 
Sebastopol, the Britannic sentiment had become institutionalized. This may be observed 
in prime-minister to be R.B. Bennett's 1914 address to his Empire Club audience. In it, he 
urged them to accept 
'Proudly the responsibilities of...race and breed...What a splendid trust it is, to 
think that you and I are trustees for posterity, that you and I will one day be 
measured by the manner in which we have discharged our obligations to those 
subject races and the millions of people that must one day fill the great fertile 
plains of South Africa and New Zealand. If that thought sinks into our minds, 
how can you and I think of independence, how can we be concerned about an 
independent Canada? Eight or nine million people could not discharge the 
responsibilities that have come down to us; we cannot be true to the race from 
which we are sprung.'82
The Anatomy of Canadian Britannic Ethnicity
Earlier in this paper it was asserted that the Anglo-Americans, French Canadians 
and Métis developed an indigenous sense of ethnic identity. Moreover, each was 
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associated with a national community that possessed clearly defined cultural and 
territorial aspirations. In the case of English Canada, the train of events that began with 
the Loyalist migrations of 1784 and culminated in the First World War helped to 
establish the English-Canadian national identity along Britannic ethnic lines. 
This ethnic core proved flexible enough to assimilate new immigrants, most of 
whom came from ethnic groups loyal to Britain. In genealogical terms, the Canadian 
Britannic looked to Britain, but conceived of the United Empire Loyalists as a special 
branch of the British family.83 In terms of nationalism, the cultural and political focus of 
the English-Canadian nation was also Britannic, though there existed the hope that 
Canada would one day play a role within an Imperial Federation that would equal or 
surpass that of Britain herself. These self-conceptions never, however, privileged the 
Canadian identity over the imperial one. In reserving ultimate salience for the Britannic 
tie, the English-Canadians bucked the trend of their fellow North American ethnies, 
failing to make a symbolic break with the mother stock, the motherland and the mother 
country. 
The Decline of Canadian Britannicism 
One of the consequences of the First World War was a reaction against 
nationalism, especially among intellectuals in Western Europe and North America. The 
historiography of the English-speaking world reflects this change of mood. Prior to 1914, 
few historical works criticized British or American nationalism. However, in post-war 
Britain, the anti-nationalist Union of Democratic Control (founded 1914) helped launch 
internationalist historiography's ascent toward paradigmatic status. As P.M. Kennedy 
noted, after 1919, 'the key [history] books_were written by members of the Union of 
Democratic Control; all were widely read and accepted almost completely in the English 
and American universities.'84 In the meantime, ethnic nationalism and race thinking had 
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fallen out of favour in the same intellectual circles.85 English-Canadian thinkers such as 
Frank Underhill were quick to pick up on these trends and attempted to de-legitimate the 
intellectual basis of ethnic Britannicism.86 This did not, however, signal an immediate end 
to Canadian Britannicism, which remained strong on the popular level, something evident 
from 1940's survey research.87
Since the Second World War, however, many believe that both Britannicism and 
Loyalism have waned in English Canada.88 Others go further and argue that British 
loyalty has been replaced by an attachment to American ideas and cultural icons.89 This 
comes out clearly in George Parkin Grant's Lament For a Nation (1965), a 'Red' Tory 
polemic against growing American (and hence laissez-faire) influence. Grant wrote that 
the defeat of the Diefenbaker government in 1963 marked the end of Canadian 
nationalism. He spoke of how, for the generation of Ontarians of the 1920s, the 'character 
of the country was self-evident. To say it was British was not to deny it was North 
American. To be Canadian was to be a unique species of North American.'90 
Grant went on to attack the liberal, 'anti-British nationalists of English-speaking 
Canada in the 1930's [who] have nearly all [become]_ consistent continentalists' as well 
as the corporate elite, whom he considered to be in league with the former.91 In 
conclusion, he lamented the Americanization of Canada and its abandonment of Tory 
principles while pouring scorn on the Whig interpretation of history which viewed the 
United States as modernity incarnate. He went on to predict that 'as consumption 
becomes primary, the [Canada-U.S.] border appears an anachronism_as the facts of our 
society substantiate continentalism, more people will explicitly espouse it.'92 
Concern about American influence has also been a staple of mainstream left-wing 
discourse. In Nationalism or Local Control (1973), the Canadian Left's overwhelming 
support for an anti-American nationalism is clearly expressed, George Woodcock being 
the only significant dissenter. For instance, Ed Broadbent, later a leader of the social-
democratic NDP, cited the power of American multinationals and the homogenizing 
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influence of American culture as reasons to adopt a Canadian nationalist approach.93 
Broadbent reiterated this position during the free trade debates preceding the 1988 
general election and put forth the view that Canadian distinctiveness rested on its 
tradition of interventionist government, which ensured a more egalitarian distribution of 
wealth. 
 The Canadian Left's vision may be viewed as merely the latest attempt to 
establish a new basis for Canadian identity. Furthermore, Canadian politicians and 
intellectuals' efforts to establish a new Canadian identity based on Nordicity in the first 
half of this century94, or Multiculturalism in the second half, may be explained as attempts 
to surmount the decline of Britannicism. In this manner, English-Canadians hoped to be 
able to escape from their historical British-American dilemma, thereby establishing a 
secure collective identity. Of course, with much work remaining to chronicle and explain 
the twentieth century decline of Canadian Britannicism, such observations must remain 
tentative. However, if these remarks can stimulate further research in this area, then they 
will have been worthwhile.
Concluding Remarks
At the outset, it was noted that the Canadian 'identity crisis' referred to in the 
English-speaking Canadian discourse could best be analyzed in terms of the divergent 
British and American strains within the English-Canadian psyche. Each of these involved 
an ideological and an ethno-symbolic component. Primary attention in this essay has 
been given to the latter, and an attempt has been made to focus on the struggle between 
English-Canadians' British symbolism and American lifestyle.
 It has been proposed that this division prevented the emergence of a distinct 
English-speaking Canadian descent community. Since such communities provide the 
symbolic basis upon which nations are formed, the insecure Loyalist origins of the 
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English-Canadian nation bequeathed to it a legacy of ontological instability. This state of 
non-ethnicity (David Bell terms it 'non-nationhood') which arose in English Canada 
should not be confused with a positive statement of ethnic identity. 
Loyalist-Britannic Canadianism properly understood was not an independent 
ethnic consciousness, but, like the identity of loyal South Africans, Australians, 
Rhodesians and even Ulster-Protestants, acted as a liminal state of mind lying between a 
British and an indigenous ethnicity. The most significant reason why such a mindstate 
was so often found in ex-British settlements is that the prestige of the British historical 
narrative contrasted so sharply with the novelty and parochiality of the local pioneering 
tradition that political and cultural elites clung to the old identity. Thus in nineteenth 
century Canada, the elite favoured membership in the British Empire not only as a 'direct 
political, military and economic counterweight to (American-driven) continentalism,' but 
also as 'a route to prominence on the world stage.'95  
It seems that the lure of British origins for the English-Canadian was akin to the 
lure of Arab descent for the Mauritian Indian in the 1970's. Both involve what Karl 
Deutsch would call the prestige factor influencing the direction of intergroup 
assimilation.96 In the case of English Canada, the prestige of British identity prevented the 
settler population from asserting a separate self-consciousness based on their new 
surroundings, selective genealogy and unique local history. Added to this was the fact 
that the English-Canadians were etically indistinguishable from the Americans. The 
result was a confused sense of English-Canadian ethnic consciousness, which, after 1867, 
fed directly into a crisis of 'Canadian' national consciousness. 
After the First World War, Canadian ethnic Britannicism, like American Anglo-
Saxonism, came to be de-legitimated. Since the 1960s, a similar development has 
occurred in Quebec. This has caused much consternation and soul-searching, as is readily 
evident from the discourse in the United States and French Quebec.97 Nevertheless, the 
existence of a unitary ethnic antecedent has given the Americans and French-speaking 
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Quebecers a stronger sense of national identity and an important resource for cultural 
renewal.98 
In the nation of English Canada, by contrast, the duality of its ethnic antecedent 
has circumvented this possibility, giving English-Canadians no sense of cultural 
rootedness. This has forced them to rely ontologically on a Canadian state that by 
definition must act as a neutral organ of compromise, a factor painfully obvious during 
recent constitutional negotiations. At once British and American, the Loyalist heritage 
leaves the contemporary English-Canadian trapped, resulting in an anxiety which is 
seamlessly projected onto the Canadian state. 
In this regard, the anguished poetry of contemporary Loyalist descendant Dennis 
Lee, applicable throughout the past two hundred years, seems likely to have relevance 
into the foreseeable future: 
'The Dream of Tory origins
Is full of lies and blanks
Though what remains when it is gone
To prove that we're not Yanks?'99 
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